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RECENT CASES
more in keeping with fundamental justice,7 as expressed in the Cole-
man case. But the court in the principal case was faced with the
practical fact that the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Statute is man-
datorily worded. The court conceded the wording of the statute,
but apparently has recognized that under the Kentucky system of
pronouncing sentence in criminal cases8 the jury could, as a matter
of fact, ignore the instructions in relation to the Habitual Criminal
Statute and convict and sentence for the single offense only. Since the
Commonwealth cannot appeal from such a verdict,9 the jury has, in
effect, exercised some discretion as to the amount of punishment
assessed.
It is submitted that this situation leaves something to be desired.
Many juries will not be strong-willed enough to ignore the instruc-
tions given them by the court and will return a verdict for a life
sentence in an instance where they would have given a lesser sen-
tence under directory instructions because of the special circum-
stances surrounding the case.
Arthur L. Brooks, Jr.
Dom~snc RELATIONS-RESTORATION OF PROPERTY VERsus LuMP Sum
AinioN-Appellee (husband) was granted a divorce in 1956 in an
action in which appellant (wife) counterclaimed for divorce, award
of alimony, and restoration of property. Property acquired during
the marriage included substantial interests in two successful busi-
nesses with an estimated value of almost $200,000, a residence which
with improvements had cost $18,000, an automobile, household
effects, and other miscellaneous personal property. Appellant had
been gainfully employed for 13 of the 16 years of marriage and had
deposited her earnings in a joint bank account. The interest in the
first of the two businesses was purchased with a $5,000 down pay-
ment and deferred payments which were made out of earnings of
the business. Of the $5,000 down payment $1,000 was borrowed from
appellants family and repaid out of business earnings. The $4,000
of the parties' own funds was made up from $3,497.04 of appellants
7 That is, the principal offense might not be of such magnitude to merit the
severe punishment of the statute; or the particular circumstances surrounding the
case, or the character of the defendant may be mitigating factors. Also see Hall
v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 894, 51 S.W. 814 (1899), for further argument along
this line.
8Under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.130 (1959), the jury "shall fix by its verdict a
punishment to be inflicted within the periods or amounts prescribed by law .. "
But compare the system of allowing the jury to only find the fact, and the court
to set the punishment in light of the jury's finding.
9The Commonwealth may not appeal to affect the defendant but only for
the purpose of settling the law on a point. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tam Tuyl,
58 Ky. (1 Met.) 1 (1858).
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separate funds and $502.96 of appellee's. Title was taken in the name
of the appellee by the common consent of the parties. The interest
in the second business was purchased with borrowed money, most
of which had been repaid out of the earnings of the business at the
time of the divorce. The residence of the parties was purchased with
a $5,000 down payment from the joint bank account plus $7,000 of
borrowed funds. Title was taken in the joint names of the parties
as tenants by the entirety, with right of survivorship. Appeal was
from a judgment denying appellants request for alimony and de-
creeing a restoration of property in the amount of her original con-
tribution to the business purchase ($3,497.04) and her remaining in-
terest in the bank account ($1,500), plus the automobile and house-
hold effects. She also appealed from the denial of her subsequent
motion to set aside the parts of the judgment relating to alimony
and property restoration on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
On appeal, the appellant contended for a proportionate part of the
property commensurate with the part of the purchase price con-
tributed by her. Held: Judgment affirmed as to restoration of prop-
erty, reversed with direction to award a new trial as to alimony on
the basis of the newly discovered evidence. Kivett v. Kivett, 312
S.W. 2d 884 (Ky. 1958).
The apparent inequity of the decision in the principal case sug-
gests comment as to the differences in theory and result between lump
sum alimony and property restoration, and a consideration of the
effect of such differences on the principal case.
In a divorce action in Kentucky the wife may be entitled to a
distribution of family assets under either of two theories: (1) As
allowance of lump sum alimony, in which case the wife must not
have been principally at fault,' and must not have sufficient estate
of her own. Under this theory the allowance to the wife must be
equitable.2  (2) By way of restoration of that which was hers to
begin with and for which no consideration was given.3 These two
'Though the wording of the applicable statute, infra note 2, would seem to
authorize an award of alimony only when the wife has obtained the divorce,
absence of principal fault has usually been the test applied by the court. See
Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 813, 844-45 (1954), collecting Kentucky cases. See also
Howard v. Howard, 291, S.W. 2d 828 (Ky. 1956).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.060 (1) (1959) provides:
If the wife does not have sufficient estate of her own she may, on a
divorce obtained by her, have such allowance out of that of her husband
as the court considers equitable; but no such allowance shall divest
the husband of the fee simple title to real estate.
SKy. Rev. Stat. § 403.060 (2) (1959) provides:
Upon final judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, each
party shall be restored all the property, not disposed of at the beginning
of the action, that he or she obtained from or through the other before
or during the marriage and in consideration of the marriage.
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RECENT CASES
theories complement each other. The first allows the trial court to
make an equitable division of the family assets, while the second
provides for the return of specific, identifiable property which the
wife wishes to recover in kind. Hence a divorce judgment may, and
frequently does, decree awards under both theories. 4
Since absence of principal fault is a prerequisite to allowance
of alimony,5 it is customary in appropriate cases for the wife to seek
both alimony and a restoration of property. Then, if alimony is denied
for fault, the wife will at least get back her own property which she
has contributed.6
"Restoration" of property is necessarily made from the party in
whom title reposes to the other party. Restoration is either in kind
(whenever possible) or of a sum of money equivalent to its value
plus accrued interest.7 Under this theory no consideration is given
to any increase or decrease in value of property into which the con-
tributed asset may have been converted.
Lump sum alimony, on the other hand, is designed to effect an
equitable division of the family assets, especially of that which has
been accumulated through the joint efforts of the parties.8 The
amount is discretionary with the court but cannot be arbitrary or in-
equitable.9 Under Kentucky law a wife who is entitled to a divorce
is entitled to alimony as a matter of course. 10 Even though the trial
court may have granted the husband the divorce, the wife is en-
titled to alimony if she has no estate of her own, was not entirely
to blame for breaking up the marriage, and was free from moral
delinquency."
4 For illustrations of the application of both theories, see Wells v. Wells,
293 S.W. 2d 718 (Ky. 1956); Burns v. Burns, 173 Ky. 105, 190 S.W. 683 (1917);
Duvall v. Duvall, 147 Ky. 426, 144 S.W. 78 (1912).
5 See note 1 supra.
6 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.065 (1959) provides in part:
Every judgment for a divorce from the bond of matrimony shall con-
tain an order restoring any property not disposed of at the commence-
ment of the action, which either party may have obtained, directly or
indirectly, from or through the other, during marriage, in consideration
or by reason thereof; and any property so obtained, without valuable
consideration, shall be deemed to have been obtained by reason of
marriage. (Emphasis added.)7 litchie v. Bitchie, 311 Ky. 569, 224 S.W. 2d 648 (1949) (specific real
estate); King v. King, 214 Ky. 171, 283 S.W. 73 (1926) (money); Bums v.
Bums, 173 Ky. 105, 190 S.W. 683 (1917) (specific items of personal property).
8 2 Henderson, Nelson on Divorce and Annulment § 14.138 (2d ed. 1945).
9 2 Henderson op. cit. supra note 8, § 14.135; Warren, Schouler Divorce
Manual 386 (19445.
10 The rule has been stated to be that . . the wife is entitled to alimony
as a matter of course, unless it appear from the proof that she was solely at fault
or guilty of such moral delinquency as to forfeit her right to alimony." Maher
v. Maher, 295 Ky. 263, 267, 174 S.W. 2d 289, 291 (1943), and cases there cited.
11 Howard v. Howard, 291 S.W. 2d 828 (Ky. 1956).
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By her amended answer and counterclaim, the appellant in the
instant case sought an absolute divorce, alhmony, and a division of
the property acquired and accumulated during marriage. 12 On appeal,
argument was advanced in support of a monthly allowance of alimony
and an equitable division of property under the restoration theory.
In view of what has already been said, it would seem to be almost
impossible to justify an equitable division under the restoration
theory. If the award is to take the form of alimony it may be either
a lump sum equitable division of property or an award of periodic
payments, or occasionally both. If the award is to include both ali-
mony and restoration of property the alimony may be in either lump
sum or periodic form, but the restored property can not exceed the
original contribution plus interest.'3
Thus, it would seem that if the appellant had been seeking
an equitable division of the family assets she should have proceeded
under the alimony rather than the restoration theory.14 The Court of
Appeals then could have entered such an award as the trial court
should have made.'5
Even though the appellant misconceived her theory on appeal,
the court still could have made the equitable division of property
contended for as an award of lump sum alimony. Superficially, the
case has been remanded for a new trial on the issue of alimony, and
a reading of the report would indicate that justice can yet be done.
Under the peculiar facts surrounding the case, however, such justice
may be more apparent than real.
When the case was remanded, the Court of Appeals knew that
the appellee was probably proceeding to dispose of and hide the
major portions of the property of which appellant claimed entitle-
ment to a fair share.'6 A subsequent petition for rehearing was denied
despite knowledge that appellee had disposed of both business in-
terests and had removed himself from the state.
7
In view of these matters outside the report of the case, it seems
that the court should have done its best to insure that an award to
the appellant would be something more than a token award.
12 Brief for Appellant, p. 61.
13 Cases cited note 7 supra.
14 It is recognized that appellant's choice of theory was probably encour-
aged by the fact that appellee had been awarded the divorce on the basis of
appellant's apparent principal fault and that she would not be entitled to alimony
unless the trial court should be reversed on appeal. However, it is felt that the
new evidence was so overwhelmingly persuasive of a. pellee's principal fault as to
nullify any justification of the choice which might otherwise exist.
15Annot., 34 A.L.R. 2d 813, 325-26 & n. 16 (1954), collecting Kentucky
cases.
16 Brief for Appellant, pp. 84-85, 95.
17 AppelantsPetition for a Rehearing, pp. 16-17.
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This seems to be a particularly apt case for the application of the
principle that the Court of Appeals may make such an award of
alimony as the trial court should have entered.' 8 Evidence was avail-
able which would tend to establish at least a minimum value of
appellee's assets, and an adequate lump sum award of alimony could,
and should, have been made on the basis of this minimum. The
new trial may very well find no property which can be attached, and
it is almost certain to find no defendant who can be served.
Robert E. Adams
18 See note 15 supra.
